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There have been important developments in the 
decentralization of the government structure in Turkey 
since the early 1980s. This paper examines economic 
development and growth in Turkish provinces. Although 
there is a rich literature on the economic effects of 
government decentralization from both developed 
and developing countries, these effects have not 
been examined widely in the context of Turkish local 
governments. The authors first describe changes since the 
early 1980s and recent reform efforts. They then provide 
an empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization in 
This paper—a product of the Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network—is part of a larger 
effort in the department to study local governance systems and decentralization in the client countries. Policy Research 
Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at syilmaz@
worldbank.org.  
Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data 
approaches. The panel dataset consists of 67 provinces 
from 1976 to 2001. The analysis examines whether 
variations in local decentralization across these provinces 
and across time have had a significant impact on 
economic development and growth in those provinces. 
The findings suggest a weak negative economic effect of 
decentralization through a number of municipalities per 
capita. However, the findings do not show any significant 
impact from the creation of new provinces by separation 
from the existing ones. 
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Decentralization efforts in developing countries in recent decades have led to an 
extensive literature on the causes and consequences of both centralization and 
decentralization. While recent studies followed a comparative perspective and showed 
similarities and differences between the decentralization efforts in a variety of developing 
countries, countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Turkey are 
largely left out of those comparisons (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006).  
Among the developing countries that have liberalized their economies, Turkey 
has gone through significant decentralization in its government structure since the early 
1980s. As the ongoing political and economic reforms in Turkey enter a new era, the 
country is preparing to deal with its prospective entry into the European Union (EU). 
Joining the EU is likely to place heightened demands on the public administration system 
of Turkey. For Turkey to meet European Union (EU) standards of service delivery there 
is an urgent need for investment in local infrastructure systems. However, it was 
impossible for local governments to meet the challenge with the archaic local government 
sector laws and regulations. Recognizing the need for reforming the local government 
sector, the government has announced an ambitious reform plan and prepared various 
legislations.  
In this paper, we examine economic development and growth in Turkish 
provinces. While there is a rich literature on the economic effects of government 
decentralization from both developed and developing countries, these effects have not 
been examined widely within the context of Turkish local governments. We first give an 
overview of the local government structure and recent reform efforts. We then provide an 
  1empirical analysis of the effects of decentralization on economic development and 
growth in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches. Our panel 
dataset consists of 67 provinces over a period from 1976 to 2001.  We examine 
specifically if variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time 
have had a significant impact on economic development and growth. We find mixed 
results from our analysis of decentralization in Turkish provinces. First, creation of new 
provinces by separation from existing provinces seems to have had no significant impact 
on development or growth in those existing provinces. On the other hand, 
decentralization through increase in the number of local governments per capita seems to 
have had a negative effect on the level economic development.  
2. Literature on Decentralization 
Decentralization is seen as an important avenue for efficiency gains by enabling a 
direct link between local provision of services and local tastes (Oates 1972, 1993). It is 
then expected that decentralization helps promote economic growth.  Numerous studies 
examined empirically the relationship between decentralization and economic growth.
1  
Among these Davoodi and Zou (1998) used a panel of 46 developed and developing 
countries for the period 1970-1985 and found a negative relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and growth in developing countries and no significant relationship for 
the developed countries.  China has been a popular case study due to its sweeping fiscal 
reforms to decentralize since late 1970s.  Zhang and Zou (1998) examined a panel of 28 
Chinese provinces during the period 1980-1992 and found a negative relationship 
                                                 
1 Other aspects of fiscal decentralization were also examined. See, for example, Oates (1985) for the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on public sector size, De Mello (2000) for a cross-country study on fiscal 
decentralization and fiscal balances, and Neyapti (2006) for a recent empirical study on revenue 
decentralization and inequality. 
  2between decentralization and growth.  Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) found a similar 
relationship for the U.S. after examining time series data from 1948 to 1994.  Other 
studies conflicted these findings by showing evidence of a positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth. For example, Lin and Liu (2000) found 
evidence of a positive relationship for the same Chinese provinces used by Zhang and 
Zou (1998) after taking into account other concurrent reforms.  In a pioneering study on 
fiscal decentralization in Turkey, Neyapti (2005) examined the links between fiscal 
decentralization and socio-economic indicators in Turkish provinces. Overall, she found a 
favorable impact of fiscal decentralization, with a positive relationship with the level and 
growth rate of output. Neyapti’s empirical analysis was constrained, however, by data 
limitations regarding the fiscal decentralization data that only allowed cross-sectional 
analyses for the years 1995 and 1998. 
In another study, Akai and Sakata (2002) pointed to the importance of controlling 
for historical or cultural differences between observations and using a period of relatively 
lower growth in a decentralization study.  To improve on the data problems of other 
studies, they used data from 50 U.S. states for the period 1992-1996.  They found 
evidence of positive contribution of fiscal decentralization to economic growth.  In a 
recent study, Stansel (2005) extended the local government empirical literature by 
examining the link between local decentralization and local economic growth using a 
new dataset of 314 U.S. metropolitan statistical areas.  He found a negative and 
significant relationship between the central city share of metro population and population 
and real per capita income growth and a positive and significant relationship between the 
number of county governments per resident and population and real per capita income 
  3growth. Hence, his study shows evidence of a positive relationship between local 
decentralization and metropolitan statistical area economic growth.  After reviewing a 
variety of past studies on decentralization and economic growth, Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2003) concluded that there is no empirical consensus on the relationship 
between decentralization and economic growth.   
3. Recent Decentralization Efforts in Turkey  
  Historically, the Turkish public administration system has had a very strong 
centralist orientation. Local governments have long been subjected to a strong 
administrative and financial tutelage. This emphasis on strong central administration was 
inherited from the Ottoman Empire and has been reinforced by the Turkish Republic as 
part of the national modernization process.
2 However, recognizing the increasing 
demands from citizens for better service delivery and to increase its chances for opening 
of European Union membership negotiations, the Turkish government announced an 
ambitious public sector reform package in 2002. Decentralization of decision-making 
power and development of modern local government system was the fundamental 
component of the government’s reform plan. Accordingly, the government has proposed 
and the Parliament has enacted several local government reform laws updating outdated 
local government laws, some of which were from the Ottoman Empire times.   
The local government system in Turkey has been organized as special provincial 
administrations (SPA), districts, villages, metropolitan municipalities and municipalities. 
SPA is an “intermediate-level” local government unit operating at provincial level. SPAs 
provide services to both urban and rural areas. The main responsibility areas of SPAs 
                                                 
2 Bayraktar (2007) provides an excellent review of the evolution of the Turkish local government system 
from Ottoman Empire times to the recent changes under the Turkish Republic.   
  4include education, health, police, infrastructure, agriculture, rural services, industry and 
trade. They also have the responsibility for providing environmental development plan, 
roads, water, sewage, solid waste, environment, emergency, culture, tourism, youth and 
sports, forestation, parks and recreation services outside of municipal boundaries. 
Currently, there are 81 provinces covering the whole territory of the country. For 
administrative purposes, provinces are subdivided into districts (ilce), which in turn are 
divided into communes (villages).  
The number of provinces has changed several times in the past. Table 1 presents 
those changes since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The number has 
stayed stable during the period between 1957 and 1989. However, recently there has been 
a rapid increase in the number of provinces. Between 1989 and 1999, 14 new provinces 
were established. Establishing a new province is a costly process for the government—it 
requires creating a new administrative structure with all line ministries’ presence.  
In 2005, the Parliament has enacted a new legislation to reform SPA system, which 
was previously regulated by an Ottoman Empire law dating back to 1913. Prior to this 
new Special Administration Law no.5302 of 2005, SPAs were strictly deconcentrated 
local government units representing the central government in provinces. With this new 
legislation the government aims to strengthen the special provincial administrations by 
assigning them various local services provided by the central government organizations 
and restructuring them along the democratic principles. 
The second type of local governments is a municipality. Municipalities are the 
decentralized local government units. They provide municipal services only in urban 
areas within provincial boundaries. The number of municipalities has increased 
  5significantly in the last two decades (see Table 2). At the present time, there are 3,225 
municipalities of which 16 are metropolitan municipalities, 100 are district municipalities 
in metropolitan municipality jurisdictions, 283 are district level first degree 
municipalities, 65 are provincial municipalities, 750 are district municipalities and 2,011 
are township municipalities. However, municipal population is concentrated in several 
large cities, leaving a large majority of municipalities with very small populations (see 
Table 3). Currently, more than half of the population (53.6 percent) lives in 122 
municipalities. More than 2,000 municipalities, which are more than 60 percent in terms 
of number of municipalities, have population less than 5,000. In other words, while the 
number of municipalities with less than 5,000 people makes up 62 percent of all 
municipalities; their population totals only 11 percent of the total population. The average 
population settled in municipalities is 16,643.  
With the increase of the number of municipalities over time, their size decreased 
and created issues of economies of scale and scope in service delivery. According to 
Keles, politicians encouraged establishment of new municipalities because of central 
government grants to localities (Keles 2000). Ruling parties at the center were reluctant 
to enforce minimum population criterion, which was set to 2,000, in fear of losing 
popular support in those localities. In 2008, the Parliament has approved a new law (Law 
No. 5747) reducing the number of municipalities by changing the status of small 
municipalities that do not meet the minimum population criterion of 2,000 per village, 
abolishing 283 first-degree municipalities and amalgamating 25 municipalities with 
nearby municipalities. This change, which will be effective after the 2009 elections, 
effectively reduces the number of municipalities to 2,105 from 3,225. With this change, 
  6there will be 16 metropolitan municipalities, 142 district municipalities in metropolitan 
municipality jurisdictions, 65 provincial municipalities, 750 district municipalities and 
1,132 township municipalities. 
Municipalities are not distributed across the country uniformly. The distribution of 
number of municipalities across regions is skewed toward the west, reflecting migration 
trends in the country. Municipalities by population and region are depicted in Table 4. 
Five population categories are: (1) population less than 5,000; (2) population 5,000-
20,000; (3) population 20,000-50,000; (4) population 50,000-100,000; and (5) population 
more than 100,000; and metropolitan municipalities. Some of the stylized facts are: 
41.4% of the municipal population lives in metropolitan municipalities. 71% of the 
municipalities in Central Anatolia and 49% of the municipalities in Southwest Anatolia 
have populations less than 5,000. Municipalities with more than 100,000 people are only 
3.3% of the municipality number. Marmara region is the only region with more than 35 
percent of municipalities with population more than 100,000. The metropolitan municipal 
population in Marmara region makes up 67.7% of all municipal population; furthermore 
its share in the region’s total population is 83.1%. 
As part of the government’s reform efforts, the Parliament enacted the Municipality 
Law no. 5393 of 2005. Prior to this legislation, municipal sector was regulated by the 
Municipality Law no.1580 of 1930. This new legislation reflected service delivery 
realities over the past 75 years. An important change with the new municipal sector law is 
the increase in the population threshold to establish a municipality to 5,000 from 2,000. 
The reason for this change is to reap the benefits of economies of scale in service 
delivery. However, this new increased threshold applies to establishment of new 
  7municipalities; it does not apply to existing municipalities that are above the minimum 
threshold of 2,000 (the minimum population criterion under the previous legislation).  
In Turkey, there is a two-tier municipal system in 16 large cities. In these cities, 
metropolitan municipalities were established in 1984 because of increasing demand for 
urban service due to high urbanization rates. As part of its reform efforts, the government 
drafted a new law and submitted to the Parliament. The Metropolitan Municipality Law 
no.5216 was enacted and approved by the Parliament in 2004. Metropolitan Municipality 
Law no. 5216 preserved this two-tier system in order to reap the advantages of having 
large structures in the city management (metropolitan municipality) and benefits of 
participation and dynamism of small structures (district municipalities under a 
metropolitan municipality). An important change with the new Metropolitan Municipality 
law is setting of minimum population criterion as 750,000 to establish a new metropolitan 
municipality. In 1984 law establishment of a new metropolitan municipality was left to 
the discretion of the central government.  
In July 2008, the Turkish Parliament approved another legislation changing criteria 
for the allocation of intergovernmental transfer shares across special provincial 
administrations and municipalities (Law no. 5779). Prior to this legislation, 
intergovernmental transfer system was based on population for both special provincial 
administrations and municipalities. This legislation changed the transfer formula for 
special provincial administrations by reducing the weight for population to 50 percent 
and adding other criteria: geographic size (10%), number of villages (10%), rural 
population (15%) and development index (15%). For municipalities it reduced the weight 
  8for population to 80 percent and added a development index (20%) to the transfer 
formula.  
4. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
As noted by Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), there are serious problems with the 
measurement of decentralization, due mainly to imperfect data generation in developing 
countries. Measuring decentralization at the province level is even more problematic than 
it is at the national level. One way to overcome data issues is to look at differences in the 
number of local governments across provinces and also across time.  Recent studies from 
the U.S. used this type of decentralization measure to examine the economic impacts of 
decentralization (Zax, 1989; Stansel, 2005; Hammond and Tosun, 2006). Zax (1989) 
used two measures, number of local governments per capita and number of local 
governments per square mile of land. While the former is used as a measure of the degree 
of scale economies, the latter can be seen as a measure of competition between local 
governments in the Tiebout sense.
3 Hammond and Tosun (2006) followed the empirical 
approach by Zax in their analysis of decentralization in the metropolitan and non-
metropolitan counties in the U.S.  
We also follow Zax and use number of local governments per capita and number 
of local governments per square mile of land as main decentralization variables. Hence 
our decentralization variables are more local political fragmentation indicators than fiscal 
decentralization measures. We should note, however, that the two are highly correlated 
and the literature used both as measures of decentralization.  We also examine creation of 
new provinces by separation from existing provinces starting in 1989 using a dummy 
                                                 
3 As Zax (1989: 563) explains “if scale economies exist, the size of the local public sector should be less 
where each government serves more citizens.” For the second measure he notes “[t]he number of 
governments in an area of fixed geographic size indicates the ease of moving between jurisdictions.” 
  9variable (Separation) that is equal to one for the years after separation and zero before 
separation. We would expect separation to have a positive economic impact on the 
existing original provinces if decentralization is thought to enhance efficiency in public 
service provision. 
We conduct our empirical analysis in two parts. First, we examine recent 
decentralization through changes in number of local governments (per capita and per 
square kilometer) by including observations from 1976 to 2001. However, we limit our 
analysis to the original 67 provinces to maintain data consistency throughout the entire 
period of study. To understand the effect of local decentralization on economic activity 
and development, we regress provincial gross domestic product per and annual growth 
rate in provincial GDP per capita on a number of explanatory variables including a 
dummy variable indicating creation of new provinces by separation from existing ones 
(Separation), number of municipalities (per capita and square kilometer of land), land 
area, total number of vehicles, and province and time fixed effects. The main data source 
for these variables is the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK).
4 
In the second part of the empirical analysis, we examine cross-sectional variation 
in decentralization across the current total of 81 Turkish provinces.
5  We picked 2000 as 
the year of analysis, which is the most recent data year before the 2001 financial crisis in 
Turkey.  In these regressions, we also use “provincial development index” as another 
                                                 
4 We use provincial GDP data of 2000 as the basis of analysis. However, TURKSTAT introduced a fourth 
revision to the GDP series and updated the base year to 1998 from 1987. Revised provincial GDP data do 
not exist yet. Since our analysis covers the period between 1976 and 2001 we believe that this change has a 
limited impact on the results.    
5 From 1989 to 1999 fourteen new provinces are created by separation from other existing provinces (see 
Table 1).  
  10dependent variable.
6 We add share of urban population as another explanatory variable. 
On the other hand, we cannot use provincial and time fixed effects due to cross-sectional 
data. Instead, we use regional dummies to control for specific regional effects. Again, our 
main data source is TUIK. Provincial development index is provided by the Turkish State 
Planning Organization (DPT). 
5. Empirical Method and Results 
 
Methodology 
We use regression analysis to estimate the effect of local government 
decentralization on economic development and growth in Turkish provinces.  The data 
are a panel of 1,724 observations that include 67 provinces for the years 1976 through 
2001.  Summary statistics of regression variables for the panel regressions are provided in 
Table 5.  Two conventional approaches for estimating panel data are the fixed-effects and 
random-effects procedures. However, if the individual province fixed-effects are 
correlated with other exogenous variables, the random-effects estimation procedure 
yields inconsistent estimates. A fixed-effects model has the advantage of removing the 
bias from the estimation caused by a possible correlation between explanatory variables 
and time-invariant province specific effects.  
For the cross-sectional regression analysis with the current number of 81 
provinces, we also control for the spatial correlation in economic activity between 
contiguous provinces. Summary statistics for these regressions are shown in Table 6.  
First introduced by Cliff and Ord (1981) and Anselin (1988), models of spatial 
dependence account for any direct influence of spatial neighbors, spillover effects, and 
                                                 
6 Provincial development index is developed by the State Planning Organization. More about the index see 
Dincer, Ozaslan and Kavasoglu (2003).  
  11externalities generated between cross-sectional observations (in this research the unit of 
observation is province).  Failing to address spatial dependence may lead to biased, 
inefficient, and/or inconsistent coefficient estimates.  In order to test for spatial 
autocorrelation in the data, we conducted diagnostic tests using data for a cross-section of 
81 provinces in 2000.  For this, we created a spatial weights matrix that shows the 
presence of potential spatial interaction between neighboring provinces.  We ran 
diagnostic tests for both the spatial error and spatial lag models (Anselin et al., 1996).  In 
a spatial error model there is an autoregressive process in the error term, whereas a spatial 
lag model assumes a spatially lagged dependent variable.  Lagrange multiplier test 
statistics are used to test the null hypothesis that autoregressive parameters are equal to 
zero.
7  The null hypothesis is rejected, indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation, 
particularly in the case of spatial lag model. 
Spatial dependence is caused by the existence of spillover effects between units of 
observation (provinces) and the presence of a direct influence from activity in one 
province on neighboring provinces.  In this case, it may be that economic activity 
measured by GDP in one province affect GDP per capita in neighboring provinces.  We 
therefore run separate regressions using the spatial lag model. 
Results 
  Empirical results are provided in Tables 7 and 8.  We start in Table 7 with the 
panel regression results.  Results in the first three columns are from regressions where log 
of GDP per capita is used as the dependent variable. Results in the next three columns 
                                                 
7 Spatial data analysis commands developed by Pisati (2001) for STATA are used to conduct the spatial 
autocorrelation diagnostic tests.  Diagnostic test output presents Moran’s I, Lagrange multiplier and Robust 
Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for the spatial error model and Lagrange multiplier and Robust Lagrange 
Multiplier test statistics for the spatial lag model.  See Anselin et al. (1996) for a detailed explanation of 
these tests. 
  12come from regressions with growth rate in GDP per capita as the dependent variable. In 
the first column, we show the results where decentralization through creation of new 
provinces by separation from existing provinces is examined through a dummy variable 
called “Separation” where Separation is 1 for the years after separation in the provinces 
that experienced separation and 0 before. We model this regression using the fixed effects 
two-stage least squares procedure since separation is likely an endogenous phenomenon. 
Using the Metrocity dummy and midyear population as instruments, we find that while 
Separation has a positive coefficient, it is not statistically significant.  In the second 
column, we replaced Separation with the log of number of municipalities per capita as 
our key decentralization variable.  Here, we find that decentralization is negatively and 
statistically significantly associated with GDP per capita. This would support the view 
that decentralization limits economic benefits from economies of scale in public service 
provision.  We get a similar result in column (3) when we replace log of municipalities 
per capita with log of municipalities per square kilometer of land.  Hence we find either 
no or negative effect of decentralization on level of GDP per capita. Economic growth 
regressions in the remaining columns in Table 6 show negative coefficients for our 
decentralization variables but none of these are statistically significant. Hence we cannot 
confirm any significant effect of decentralization on the economic growth rates in the 
provinces. Among other control variables in the regressions, we find that total vehicles 
per capita has positive and significant association with GDP per capita and GDP growth 
in almost all regressions. The Metrocity dummy also has a positive and significant 
coefficient in two of the GDP per capita regressions. 
  13  We now turn to cross-sectional spatial regressions in Table 8. In the first two 
columns, we examine the relationship between our decentralization variables and the 
level of GDP per capita, similar to our approach in Table 7.  One difference is we focus 
on number of municipalities per capita and per square kilometer of land. While we get a 
negative coefficient for the regression with number of municipalities per capita in column 
(1), the coefficient for the number of municipalities per square kilometer turns positive in 
column (2). In both cases, however, we lose statistical significance. When we use 
provincial development index instead of GDP per capita, we find significant results for 
the decentralization variables. In column (3) we find that there is a negative and 
significant association between the number of municipalities per capita and the 
development index, similar to what we found in column (2) of Table 7. In column (4) 
there is now a positive and significant association between the number of municipalities 
per square kilometer and the development index.  This may indicate that while existence 
of scale economies produce negative development effects from decentralization, 
decentralization produces a counteracting positive impact through greater degree of 
competition and ease of inter-jurisdictional mobility. Among the control variables, total 
vehicles per capita and share of urban population have consistently positive and 
significant associations with GDP per capita or development index in all regressions. 
Being a metrocity seems to have a positive and significant association with economic 
development in the last two regressions.  Results for the regional dummies show that 
Marmara Region, in particular, has a significantly higher development level compared to 
the omitted region dummy for the Central Anatolia Region. 
  
  146. Summary and Conclusions  
 
  It is important to examine the impact of past decentralization in Turkey as the 
country is going through significant reforms, including public administration reform, in 
the EU accession process. More decentralization is expected in Turkey as the Parliament 
has recently approved a new law (Law No. 5747) that could substantially reduce the 
number of municipalities in provinces starting in 2009. In the midst of these reform 
efforts, we find mixed results in our analysis of past decentralization in Turkish 
provinces. First, creation of new provinces by separation from existing provinces seems 
to have had no significant impact on development or growth in those existing provinces. 
On the other hand, decentralization through increase in the number of local governments 
per capita seems to have had a negative effect on at least the level economic 
development. The other decentralization measure, number of local government per square 
kilometer of province land gives us different results in different regressions. The cross-
sectional regressions that used more recent data show that enhanced competition through 
more municipalities per square kilometer produced favorable results in terms of 
economic development levels across provinces.  
  The evidence that there is a negative effect of decentralization through number of 
municipalities per capita may be pointing to the importance of economies of scale in 
public service provision. At the same time, there seems to be weak evidence that Tiebout 
style local government competition may have enhanced economic efficiency in Turkish 
provinces, which requires further study. 
  As a future extension, one can expand on Neyapti (2005) and seek panel data for 
the period from 1980 to 2000 to examine the impact of extensive “fiscal decentralization” 
  15within provinces during that period, in addition to local government decentralization 
through political fragmentation. Additionally, it may be worth looking at the impact of 
different local government types such as larger vs. smaller municipalities in terms of 
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  18Table 1. Number of Provinces by Year 
Year  Number  Names of new provinces  Year   Number  Names of new provinces 
1924 74  Artvin, Kars, Ardahan  1957 67  Kirsehir 
1926 63  Uskudar, Beyoglu, Catalca, Gelibolu, 
Ardahan, Mus, Dersim, Genc, Siverek, 
Ergani and Kozan were downgraded to 
district. 
1989 71  Aksaray, Bayburt, Karaman, 
Kirikkale 
1929 63  Mus became a province; Bitlis was 
downgraded to district. 
1990 73  Batman, Sirnak 
1933 57  Aksaray, Cebelibereket, Artvin, 
Sebinkarahisar, Hakkari were downgraded 
to district. Mersin and Silifke were merged 
to create Icel province. 
1991 74  Bartin 
1936 62  Artvin, Hakkari, Bitlis, Bingol, Tunceli  1992 76  Ardahan, Igdir 
1939 63  Hatay  1995 79  Yalova, Kilis, Karabuk 
1953 63  Usak became a province; Kirsehir was 
downgraded to district.  
1996 80  Osmaniye 
1954 66  Adiyaman, Sakarya, Nevsehir  1999 81  Duzce 
Source: Kilinc, Gokcen and Gulersoy, Nuran Z. 2007.  
 
 
Table 2. Number of Municipalities by Year 
Year Number  Year Number 
1923 421  1980 1727 
1935 505  1985 1703 
1945 583  1988 1925 
1950 628  1992 2270 
1955 809  1993 2553 
1960 995  1994 2715 
1965 1062 1997 2801 
1970 1303 2000 3225 
1975 1654    
Source: Keles. 2000. p.221. 
 
 
Table 3. Municipalities by Population 
Population   Number  % of Municipalities % of Population 
0-2000 353  10.9  1.1 
2000-5000 1.652  51.2  9.6 
5000-10000 559  17.3  7.0 
10000-20000 274  8.5  7.1 
20000-50000 182  5.6  10.7 
50000-100000 83  2.6  10.8 
+100000 122  3.8  53.6 




  19Table 4. Municipalities by Region and Population Size, 2000 
Regions  1  2  3  4  5  Metro Mun. Total 
Marmara  207  108  46 13 38  4 416 
Black  Sea  341  144  35 13  8  1 542 
Mediterranean  364  147  24 10 16  3 462 
Aegean  421  125  24 12  2  1 595 
East  Anatolia  155  91 17 12  6  1 282 
Southwest  Anatolia  45 64 10 14 10  2 195 
Central  Anatolia    522  154  26 9 18 4  733 
Total  2,005  833  182 83 106 16  3,225 
Source: T.C. Basbakanlik. 2005. p. 48. 
(1) Population less than 5,000   (2) Population between 5,000 and 20,000   (3) Population between 20,000 
and 50,000   (4) Population between 50,000 and 100,000   (5) Population more than 100,000 
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics for the Panel Regressions 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
          
GDP per capita in 
province 1,742  1,152,298  652,109  252,450  4,711,093 
          
Growth rate in GDP 
per capita  1,675  1.532449  9.372217  -37.7538  88.41553 
          
Metrocity dummy  1,742  0.102756  0.303726  0  1 
          
Separation dummy  1,742  0.056257  0.230484  0  1 
          
Midyear population  1,742  792,056.2  955,576.4  91,309  1.02E+07 
          
Land area of 
province in square 
Km. 1,742  11,401.99  7,234.895  3,310  49,683 
          
Number of 
Municipalities per 
capita  1,742 0.0000508 0.0000271  0.0000028  0.000152 
          
Number of 
municipalities per 
square km.  1,742  0.003224  0.002325  0.000435  0.016509 
          
Number of vehicles 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for the Cross-Sectional Spatial Regressions 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
          
GDP per capita in province  81  1,411,365  842,235.1  315,760.8  4,331,186 
          
Provincial development 
index  81 -0.000000244  1.000001  -1.43956  4.80772 
          
Land area of province in 
square Km.  81  9,673.03  6,580.966  850.46  40,814 
          
Metrocity  dummy  81 0.1851852  0.390868 0  1 
          
Share of urban population  81  0.5555888  0.1192445  0.2606283  0.9102262 
          
Number of Municipalities per 
capita 81  0.0000631  0.0000309  7.39E-06  0.0001494 
          
Number of municipalities per 
square km.  81 0.0046132  0.0030751  0.0008702  0.0165094 
          
Number of vehicles per 
capita 81  0.0823766  0.0479214  0.0112942  0.203185 
          
Regional dummies:          
Meditterranean 81  0.0987654 0.3002057  0  1 
Eastern  Anatolia  81 0.1851852  0.390868 0  1 
Aegean 81  0.0987654  0.3002057  0  1 
Southeast Anatolia  81  0.0987654 0.3002057  0  1 
Central Anatolia  81  0.1604938  0.3693504  0  1 
Black Sea  81  0.2222222  0.41833  0  1 
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Table 7. Panel Data Regressions        




Log of GDP 
Per Capita 
 
Log of GDP 
Per Capita 
 
Log of GDP 
Per Capita 
Growth Rate 
in GDP Per 
Capita   
Growth Rate 
in GDP Per 
Capita 
Growth Rate 
in GDP Per 
Capita 
           
Log of area size  0.516  0.045    -26.874  -8.812   
in SqKm  (0.327)  (0.031)    (21.054)  (2.140)***   
           
Metrocity  -0.019  0.026  0.034  2.051 0.362 0.398 
dummy  (0.035)  (0.016)*  (0.016)**  (2.247) (1.084) (1.100) 
           
Separation 0.359      -13.542     
dummy (0.245)      (15.729)     
           
Log of total  0.213  0.265  0.216  3.648  2.835  3.705 
vehicles per capita  (0.031)***  (0.025)***  (0.025)***  (2.076)*  (1.767)  (1.751)** 
           
Log of number of    -0.113      -0.571   
municipalities per 
capita 
  (0.022)***     (1.497)  
           
Log of number of      -0.060      -1.262 
municipalities per 
square km 
   (0.021)***      (1.469) 
           
Constant 9.794  13.324  14.277  252.872  78.014  -1.568 
  (3.074)*** (0.355)*** (0.193)***  (197.697)  (24.041)***  (10.522) 
           
Observations  1742 1742 1742  1675  1675  1675 
           
Number of provinces  67  67  67  67  67  67 
           
Within  R-squared  0.48 0.53 0.52  0.12  0.15  0.14 
Standard  errors  in  parentheses.        
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Table 8. Cross-sectional Spatial Lag Regressions      
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Log of GDP Per 
Capita 






        
Log of share of   0.626  0.671  0.765  1.376 
Urban population  (0.189)***  (0.175)***  (0.278)***  (0.300)*** 
        
Log of area size  -0.061    -0.120   
in SqKm  (0.058)    (0.086)   
        
Metrocity -0.075  -0.106  0.418  0.670 
Dummy (0.108)  (0.092)  (0.158)***  (0.159)*** 
        
Log of number of  -0.022    -0.652   
municipalities per capita  (0.078)    (0.116)***   
        
Log of number of    0.001    0.183 
municipalities per 
square km 
 (0.059)    (0.102)* 
        
Log of total  0.382  0.367  0.524  0.442 
vehicles per capita  (0.072)***  (0.070)***  (0.104)***  (0.119)*** 
        
Regional Dummies:      
Meditterranean -0.038  -0.017  -0.303  -0.138 
 (0.122)  (0.121)  (0.181)*  (0.208) 
Eastern Anatolia  -0.264  -0.223  -0.352  0.233 
 (0.154)*  (0.145)  (0.221)  (0.242) 
Aegean 0.134  0.132  0.170  0.237 
 (0.129)  (0.130)  (0.189)  (0.222) 
Southeast Anatolia  0.014  0.073  -0.859  -0.218 
 (0.156)  (0.137)  (0.238)***  (0.241) 
Black Sea  0.098  0.155  -0.210  0.228 
 (0.119)  (0.103)  (0.186)  (0.183) 
Marmara 0.324  0.348  0.226  0.530 
 (0.130)**  (0.126)***  (0.195)  (0.216)** 
        
Constant 12.012  11.105  -3.332  2.772 
 (2.019)***  (1.682)***  (1.418)**  (0.683)*** 
        
Observations 81  81  81  81 
       
Standard errors in parentheses. Dummy for Central Anatolia Region is omitted to avoid the dummy variable trap.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 